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WHERE HAVE ALL THE
ON-LINE GROCERS GONE?
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
DEMISE OF ON-LINE GROCERS
M. Theodore Farris, II
University of North Texas
Phil Wilson
University of North Texas

Online grocer Webvan Group, Inc., fired a salvo across the shopping carts of the
brick-and-mortar supermarket industry when it announced that within two
years it would be delivering Web ordered groceries free-of-charge in 26 major
markets throughout the United States (Dembeck, 1999).
~ July 14, 1999

Webvan Joins List of Dot.Com Failures: Online Grocer Burned Up $830 Million
Since 1999 (Mangalindan, 2001).
- July 10, 2001
ABSTRACT

The grocery concept has evolved over many years to drive cost out of the process. Grocery
margins are very thin, typically ranging from 1% to 1 1/2 % such that the grocery business
continues to look for innovative ways to take cost out of the process. Ordering groceries on
the Internet was initially thought to be a very promising new opportunity. So what happened
to on-line grocers? This paper considers what went right and what went wrong for the on-line
grocers and uncovers a few logistics lessons along the way.

Spring 2002

9

THE CHANGING FACE OF THE
GROCERY INDUSTRY
The grocery concept has evolved over many years
to drive cost out of the process. Consider how the
frontier store, where the customer gave the
storeowner a shopping list and he personally
picked out the groceries from his shelves, gave
way to the invention of the shopping cart in 1936
(Wilson 1978) and the concept of allowing
multiple customers to roam the store to pick out
their own groceries. Not only did it lower cost
but it allowed the grocery to handle more
customers at the same time. The concept has
been incorporated in virtually all the current
models of grocery retailing from the convenience
store to traditional grocery store to warehouse
club. All have the common element of customer
pick. Today, Walmart, with 2,941 stores, owns
1.6 million shopping carts where up to 550 carts
are used at any given time (Cahill, 1999).
According to industry statistics, the average
supermarket’s labor expense is currently about
12 percent of sales. Of the labor expense, it is
estimated that grocery stocking expense is about
10 percent of its labor expense, or 1.2 percent of
sales (Anonymous, 1999). Grocery margins are
very thin, typically ranging from 1% to 1 Wfo.
The grocery business continues to look for
innovative ways to take cost out of the process.
For example, in the distribution process of the
typical traditional supermarket, a can of tuna
changes hands on average 14 times between the
food-packing factory and the customer’s can
opener. Software, networks and warehouse
automation can reduce the tuna can’s turnover to
11 pairs of hands or fewer. This leads to lower
costs, and, if not completely passed on to the
consumer, to higher margins (Anonymous, 2000).
Ordering groceries on the Internet was initially
thought to be a very promising new method to
lower cost. People generally want convenience,
time- and labor-saving approaches, especially in
two-worker households where there’s little time
for leisurely shopping. So if price, ordering,
quality, freshness and delivery are the same with
an Internet grocer, why not—some would
10
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say—bypass the traditional grocery store and the
need to traverse long aisles, line up at the
checkout, and all that hassle (Sleeper, 1999)?
Dot.com grocers were formed anticipating that
information flow would be a means of driving
cost out of the process and increasing margins.
Table 1 shows a comparison of the typical
supermarket and an on-line grocery delivery
model utilized by Streamline to sup-port that
claim. A 1998 study by Andersen Consulting
predicted that the number of households buying
groceries on-line would reach 15 million by 2007
(Santosus 1998). Forrester Research estimated
that on-line grocery shopping in the United
States would grow from $509 million in 1999 to
$10.3 billion in 2004. Progressive Grocer (2001)
estimates the overall grocery industry in the U.S.
to be $494 billion, suggesting the on-line grocery
share would grow from 0.1% to 2.1%.

TABLE 1
STREAMLINE VS. TYPICAL
SUPERMARKETS
Typical

Supermarket*

Streamline

Cost of Goods Sold

75%

72%

Operating Costs

17%

13%

Distribution

4%

6%

Corporate
Overhead

3%

3%

Net Profit

1%

6%

* Figures compiled by Smart Store, a research and
development initiative at Anderson Consulting (Hannu
and Tanskanen 2001).

So what happened to on-line grocers? The most
telling quote came from a Morningstar
newsletter.
Peapod...reminds me of the guy who
wants to increase his income, and takes

TABLE 2
FINANCIAL RESULTS FROM PUBLICLY-TRADED ON-LINE GROCERS
2Q ’01

IQ ’01

4Q ’00

3Q ’00

Streamline
Revenue
Loss

2Q ’00

IQ ’00

1999

1998

8.86
-11.45

8.46
-11.72

15.38
-19.50

6.95
-11.37

Peapod
Revenue
Loss

25.27
-15.45

23.73
-23.83

21.79
-9.80

22.73
-10.39

24.91
-12.74

73.13
-28.45

69.27
-21.57

WebVan
Revenue
Loss

77.23
-216.97

84.19
-173.14

52.06
-147.97

28.30
-74.37

16.27
-57.82

13.31
-144.57

-12.00

out an ad offering $1.20 in return for
every $1 bill he receives. To be sure, he’ll
get a lot of $1 bills— his revenues, so to
speak. The drawback is that he loses
$0.20 on each one (Kelly, 1999).
As of this writing the financial markets for on
line grocers have been devastated. Publicly
traded on-line grocers have closed their doors.
Others never reached their anticipated IPO.
Table 2 reflects the financial results of the three
largest publicly traded on-line grocers.
Streamline and Webvan dissolved, and Peapod
sold its remaining assets to Ahold NV. Another
on-line firm, GroceryWorks, never reached the
IPO stage, but sold its remaining assets to Tesco.
This article considers what went right and what
went wrong for the on-line grocers.

1997

1996

59.61
-12.98

29.17
-9.57

processing customer orders, inventory, payments,
and distribution (Anonymous 2000).
FULFILLMENT MODELS
There were two types of facilities in use; in-store
fulfillment centers (SFC) and dedicated fulfill
ment centers (DFC) (Anonymous, 1999). If the
process has low volume, a SFC was the likely
choice. The target market and desired products
also may have dictated using a SFC. For
example, a SFC seems to be appropriate for
speciality and small store operations. If volume
grows, then moving from a SFC to a DFC is in
order. If the objective was to enter into a new
geographical territory, or if the company was
very optimistic about demand, a DFC was most
likely implemented because of its anticipated
cost and efficiency benefits (Anonymous, 1999).

THE VIRTUAL SUPERMARKET
The definition of a Virtual Supermarket or on
line grocer is a store that sells directly to end
consumers a full range of grocery products (for
example, fresh and frozen food, toiletry, etc.).
Customer orders are received through the
Internet and picked by shopping personnel or
robots. The ordered groceries can be delivered to
consumers or can be picked up at a customer
collection point. The system is complemented by
“back-office” procedures that take care of

It is in terms of fulfillment efficiencies that the
models really differ. While Peapod and Tesco
fulfilled orders out of actual stores, Streamline,
Homerun, WebVan, and GroceryWorks relied on
DFCs to process orders (Mathews, 1997).
In-Store Fulfillment (SFC) Model
The store pick model was pioneered by Peapod,
which tapped into the existing logistics
infrastructure, utilizing the retail store as the
Spring 2002
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end distribution point. All they did was bridge
the gap between store and home, and charge a
premium for the service (Casper 1998). In its
early days as a Chicago-area start-up, Peapod
fulfilled orders by picking items from the shelf of
a local Jewel grocery chain. Unfortunately, this
method lost Peapod money. So, as Peapod
expanded into other markets and increase
volume, it switched to establishing its own
distribution centers, another money losing
strategy (Holst 2001). Peapod's delivery costs
averaged about $12 per order. Recall from Table
1 that the typical supermarket’s distribution
costs run about 6%. A typical Peapod customer
would spend $120 per order (Lindsay, 1999) and
was charged a $4.95 flat monthly fee, $4.95 per
order and 5% of the total order. (Leibs, 1997) so
the additional cost per order averaged $13.42 or
about 11.2%.
Peapod returned to the SFC model when it
aligned itself with Royal Ahold to receive muchneeded cash to continue operations. Peapod now
uses existing Royal Ahold stores, such as Stop &
Shop and Giant, for its inventory. It's a model
similar to that employed by Tesco, the U.K.
grocery giant that took a 35 percent stake in
Safeway's GroceryWorks.com. It is likely Tesco
will convert the GroceryWorks operations to the
SFC model. Putting itself under the aegis of a
brick-and-mortar grocer may help Peapod reduce
marketing costs. Webvan spent between 25 and
35 percent of its revenue on advertising,
compared with about 1 percent for traditional
grocery chains (Moore, 2001).
Dedicated Fulfillment Center (DFC) Model
The warehouse/depot model seeks to create its
own efficient home delivery infrastructure. It
takes the retail store out of the cost structure,
delivering directly from the warehouse, and
affords the opportunity to consolidate delivery of
multiple product classes as well as services to the
home, while creating a lower cost structure

12
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(Casper, 1998). A typical Webvan warehouse
cost $30 million to build (Moore, 2001).
Streamline had the most innovative approach to
fulfillment using a DFC. A setup team was dis
patched to a customer's house where the contents
of the kitchen were scanned to create a personal
shopping list, which typically accounted for 70% to
75% of a family's weekly order. A delivery day was
determined. The family was given a UPC code list
as its core shopping list, plus another list of the
products and services available through Stream
line. To order, family members checked off from
their core list and the additional services list to
determine their weekly needs, which may include
video rentals, dry cleaning and bottled water,
among others. As long as the order was placed by
midnight, delivery would take place by 6 p.m. the
next day (Liebeck, 1997b).
The heart of the Streamline system was the
Streamline “box.” This was a combination re
frigerator, freezer/dry storage cabinet measuring
five feet wide by five feet high by two feet deep
that was placed in the customers' garage at no
charge. The company operated a fleet of trucks
that had three different temperature zones to
maintain the integrity of the products (Liebeck,
1997a) and make weekly deliveries to the box.
The customer did not have to be present for
delivery to take place.
To support their delivery model, Streamline built
a 56,000-square-foot distribution center in
Westwood, Massachusetts, with about 10,000
different items in regular stock (by comparison,
the typical supermarket carries about 30,000)
(Leibs, 1997). Streamline customers paid a box
installation charge of $39 and a monthly fee of
$30 (Mathews, 1997). The average Streamline
customer ordered goods 47 out of 52 times per
year and spent an average of $100 per week, or
about $5,200 per year (Liebeck, 1997a). The
customer spent approximately 7.7% of the
purchases on installation and monthly fees.

ALTERNATIVE
FULFILLMENT APPROACHES
Another model, exemplified by NetGrocer, more
closely approached the electronic commerce
initiatives seen in other industries by
outsourcing the delivery function to FedEx. It
offered convenient ordering over the Internet,
but delivery service was slower than the other
alternatives (Casper, 1998). Natgrocer delivered
to 49 continental states, as well as APO/FPO and
Diplomatic Pouch zip codes (Anonymous, 2001).
It offered 2,500 SKUs of only non-perishable
groceries for a delivery cost of $2.99 for the First
10 pounds and 99 cents per every additional 10
pounds. (Liebeck, 1997b).
Webhouse Club, a subsidiary of Priceline.com,
had buyers log on and bid for items using four
pre-selected discounts of up to 50% on 150
grocery items. Customers selected from two
brands for each item and could not rank
preferences. Customers had to accept Priceline’s
specified quantities and the chances of having a
bid accepted were greater if they bid higher. The
results appeared within 60 seconds. Customers
paid on-line using a credit card and then printed
out a prepaid list. The customer then had to go to
any of a number of supermarkets from
Philadelphia to Connecticut to pick up the
groceries. (Setton, 2000).
The most successful model to date involves an
existing grocery chain with a strong market
presence that develops its own on-line ordering
system and uses its own stores as the warehouse.
United Kingdom grocer Tesco was the company
that "cracked the code," by discovering that if it
rolled out small, by sending just two trucks to the
right store, its on-line operation could be
profitable (Mahoney, 2001). Tesco says it
operates the largest and most successful
Internet-based grocery home shopping service in
the world with almost 1 million registered
customers and processing over 70,000 orders
each week. It is profitable with sales of about
$420 million a year. (Macaluso, 2001).

BASICS BEHIND GROCERY LOGISTICS
Consider what the on-line grocers are up against.
They deal with a relatively low order value
(around $100), low margins (1%-11/2%), frequent
replenish-ment, short shelf life with meat,
produce, and dairy products, all shapes and sizes,
different strategies regarding depth (defined as
the number of different products in a line) versus
width (defined as the number of product lines
offered), a compressed delivery window and
restrictions as to when the customer is available,
varying picking costs, and specialized storage
and transportation needs.
Quality control is a critical factor. Assume an
on-line grocer with sales of $50 million has an
average order size of $100. Also, assume the
order consists of 50 items. This would require 25
million picking transactions across 500,000
orders. If a company were able to achieve a
picking accuracy of 99.5%, one in four orders
would contain an error, clearly an unacceptable
rate from the consumer perspective, especially
with “time-starved” consumers looking for less
stress (Beech, 1997).
Streamline tried to capitalize on the trade-off
between higher transportation costs and lower
real estate costs. Streamline's DFC had real
estate costs of about $6.50 per square foot vs. the
supermarket's typical $18 to $24 per square foot.
Of course, it could be argued that SFC models
have no real estate investment since it functions
inside existing retail units (Mathews, 1997).
CONSUMER BEHAVIOR REASONS ON
LINE GROCERY WILL NOT WORK
An October 1999 survey by Fast Company
revealed significant attitudinal barriers to
buying groceries on-line. Indeed, these barriers
were even more signi-ficant than barriers to
other on-line activities.
Reasons for consumer resistance include the
following:

Spring 2002

13

1. Grocery shopping is a habitual act. While the
average consumer shops for groceries 2.2
times per week, few consumers shop so often
for cars, books, or airline tickets. Thus,
grocery shopping is more habitual, and it will
take more effort to change consumer buying
patterns. Moreover, consumers often visit
several stores in a week, presumably looking
for specific items or hoping to take advantage
of specific promotions.
2. Grocery shopping is a community act. Most
grocery consumers shop with someone, be it
a spouse, child, or friend. On-line grocers
must overcome the “serious social obstacle”
that the community function of buying
groceries at local supermarkets—where folks
can interact with friends, neighbors, and
relatives—is sometimes more important than
the inconvenience associated with filling up a
shopping cart.
3. There is no significant time savings
associated with on-line shopping. Excluding
driving time, the average consumer spends
45 minutes in his visit to the supermarket
while the Peapod buyer spends 37 minutes.
4. Delivery is cumbersome and expensive, but
also slow. In the age of instant gratification,
Internet delivery will have to offer significant
value to make up for slow delivery relative to
traditional shopping (Jones, 1999).
LOGISTICS PRINCIPLES
COMPONENTS THAT MADE SENSE
The principle of selective risk suggests
designing logistics systems so that the system
performance objectives are directly related to the
importance of the product or customer to the firm
(LaLonde, 1993). Streamline's research led the
company to believe that stocking 55% of the
currently available SKU count could cover
approximately 90% of retail demand. This
premise was strengthened by research showing
that 33% of grocery shoppers accounted for 56%
of purchases, and that 30% of customers

14
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TABLE 3
ON-LINE USER ATTITUDES
% of Respondents
who never plan to
do the following
on-line

1%

% Who believe the
following activities are better
on-line than the
traditional way

Research

87%

11%

Buy airline tickets

57%

12%

Buy books

38%

34%

Buy cars

24%

44%

Buy groceries

12%

60%

View pornography

14%

Source: Jones, 1999

accounted for 73% of all branded packaged goods
purchases (Mathews, 1997). Seventy-two percent
of Streamline's sales came from the lower margin
grocery category. The balance came from
products and services, such as dry cleaning and
specialty foods (e.g., prepared meals, buffet
trays), on which margins are higher. For
example, their dry-cleaning service charged
Streamline 95 cents for shirts, which the
company retailed for $1.50. A suit that cost
Streamline $3.75 brought in $6.50 (Mathews,
1997).
The principle of information selectivity has
an underlying assumption that information is as
much of a resource to the decision maker as
capital, human resources, and facilities.
Information should be treated with the same
operational, tactical, and strategic importance as
any other resources of the firm (LaLonde, 1993).
PeaPod recognized the capture of consumer
usage patterns held value beyond just driving
their delivery process. Peapod received revenue
from selling information about its customers'
buying habits to food suppliers (Leibs, 1997).

The principle of transaction simplification
suggests improving the efficiency and effective
ness of the transaction through simplification
(LaLonde, 1993). By stocking 75% fewer stock
keeping units, on-line grocers could achieve
significant cost savings. The average brick-andmortar supermarket stocks 40,333 items; HomeGrocer.com stocked 11,000 items and Peapod
20,000 items. Lower numbers of SKUs improved
inventory control and reduced sales lost to out-of
stocks to typically 3.1%. Approximately 8.2% of
SKUs in brick-and-mortar stores are out-of-stock
at any one time, so reducing SKLU by 75% should
have significantly improved tracking ability and
reduced lost sales associated with out of stocks
(Jones, 1999).
The principle of variance reduction recog
nized that in any logistics system there are a
series of linkages between demand and supply
points. Failure to accurately anticipate demands
at the next stage in the system often leads to
erosion of system productivity. This erosion, in
the form of excessive inventory, overtime,
increased stock outs, or a variety of other vari
ables, can directly effect system productivity and
performance. This principle suggests that a
logistics manager can significantly influence the
productivity of the system by reducing unplanned
variance in the system (LaLonde, 1993).
Approximately 85% of grocery purchases are
repetitive (Richards, 1996). Most on-line grocers
recognized this fact and designed past-use
libraries for their customers. This not only
reduced the time it took to place an order after
the initial learning curve, it served as a prompt
to remind the customer of items they had
overlooked.
The principle of inventory velocity suggests
that, in order to achieve asset productivity in the
management of inventory assets, logistics man
agers must focus their efforts on both the level of
inventory and the velocity of inventory (inventory
turnover) (LaLonde, 1993). Simply put, the on
line grocers never could reach high enough
volumes in a concentrated area to achieve the
efficiencies necessary for profitability. The bulky

nature of the deliveries limited Peapod’s trucks
to about 22 daily—a fraction the number that a
typical FedEx or UPS truck makes (Holst, 2001).
In the entire Chicago market, Peapod conducted
at most 1,200 transactions a day. By contrast, a
single supermarket in that market conducts an
average of 2,100 transactions a day (Holst, 2001).
The principle of shared/shifted risk has as its
guiding objective the shifting of the logistics cost
structure from a fixed cost base to a variable cost
base. By shifting costs to a supplier upstream in
the channel (e.g., Kanban) or downstream to a
customer (e.g., placing order by computer
terminal), the logistics manager can shift fixed
investment cost and risk outside the firm
(LaLonde, 1993). While the on-line grocers were
able to shift the ordering process to the customer,
in return they accepted the burden of picking and
delivery, which turned out to be a very
inequitable and costly trade.
LESSONS LEARNED
Why did the on-line grocery concept fail? The
demise of the on-line grocer was largely the
result of the inability to achieve high enough
volumes to override the additional costs of the
on-line process. Some of these costs were start
up related and others were inherent in the
process. It is also possible that the enthusiasm of
e-commerce may have allowed some critical
oversights in strategic expansion plans.
Many differing models of grocery retailing have
evolved over time from the convenience store to
traditional grocery store to warehouse club. All
have the common element of customer pick.
Perhaps the on-line design was too radical.
Whether using warehouse automation or
personal shopper, the on-line grocers failed to
keep this cost element low. Clearly the benefits
achieved by passing off the picking process
directly to the consumer are great. Peapod’s own
research indicated a delivery pricing barrier of
$10 per delivery. Attempts to incorporate a
delivery fee covering additional costs failed.
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Quality control was a major factor. The number
of items in the typical order exposed the process
to one picking error out of every four orders. The
inconvenience of an incorrect order likely
prevented some customers from repeating the
process.

should cost “a little more” than Federal Express
next day. If fact, the total cost of handling a
next-flight out shipment typically exceeds $160
per package. Purchasing decisions based on total
cost must correctly recognize the costs.
CONCLUSION

The initial start-up cost of using an on-line
grocer required that customers recognize the
learning curve effect and accept this up-front cost
in order to achieve future savings. In addition,
consumers failed to realize the true value of their
time or of the effort of the provider. This is not
uncommon. Focus groups interviewed by nextflight-out transportation provider NextJet
indicated they felt immediate freight services

This article considered the changing face of the
grocery industry. It considered the different
types of on-line fulfillment and the basics driving
grocery logistics. It looked at what worked and
what did not work from a consumer behavior and
logistics perspective. Finally it offered important
lessons to be learned from the demise of the on
line grocer.
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